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I. Introduction
Income tax rates have long been recognized as a major
determinant of income tax evasion. On a theoretical level, the
consequences for evasion of changes in the tax rate have been
analyzed under a variety of tax structures. The results have generally
been indeterminate in that they depend on the shape of the tax
function, the base of the penalty multiplier, the attitude towards risk,
and whether or not true income and the detection probability are
endogenous.
Most theoretical models explicitly account for only one tax rate:
'the' tax rate when a proportional system is assumed, and the
marginal rate when a nonproportional tax structure is postulated.
While the former treatment is appropriate given that under a
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proportional system there is but one tax rate, the latter may be overly
simplistic. Under a nonproportional tax regime there is also an average
tax rate which is typically different from the marginal rate. Traditional
tax theory suggests that because these two rates tend to have
differing effects, both should be accounted for when considering the
overall effect of a tax rate change. Nevertheless, given that the results
from theoretical evasion models using a single tax rate are already
ambiguous, it is unlikely that adding this additional complication will
lead to significant new insights.
In the empirical evasion literature, the general approach has
been to follow the theoretical models and include only a single tax rate
variable. With the exception of the game-simulation studies, these
analyses have pertained to economies with progressive tax systems
and therefore have included only a marginal tax rate variable, which
has generally been found to have a significant positive impact on
evasion. But there is a potential problem with this approach that has
thus far gone unnoticed. To the extent that the average tax rate has
an effect separate from that of the marginal tax rate, its exclusion
from these models may lead to misleading results.
In this paper, we argue that the average tax rate does indeed
have an effect on tax evasion which is separate from, and opposite to
that of the marginal tax rate. Further, we contend that failure to
explicitly account for this effect in an empirical evasion model will bias
the parameter estimate of the marginal tax rate in a predictable
manner. Finally, we provide some empirical evidence supporting these
assertions.

II. Theoretical Considerations
The effect of tax rates on the income tax evasion decision of a
risk averse individual was first analyzed by Allingham and Sandmo
[1972], who considered a proportional tax regime where marginal and
average tax rates are the same. They showed that, if detected evaders
are subjected to fines which are imposed on evaded income, a change
in the tax rate generates both an income and a substitution effect. In
this case, if risk aversion is a decreasing function of income, the two
effects oppose each other so that the total effect on reported income
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is, a priori, ambiguous. In an important note on Allingham and
Sandmo's article, Yitzhaki [1974] showed that, if taxes are
proportional and fines are levied on evaded taxes rather than on
evaded income, there is no substitution effect. As a result, if risk
aversion is a decreasing function of income, the effect on reported
income of a change in the tax rate is positive.
Subsequent theoretical studies [e.g. Pencavel, 1979 and
Koskela, 1983] have extended the analysis to incorporate progressive
tax systems, where marginal and average tax rates can be different1.
For example, Pencavel has shown that Yitzhaki's finding applies to the
marginal tax rate when the tax function is either linear- or nonlinearprogressive2. However, if true income is made endogenous through the
introduction of a labor-leisure trade off, the effect on evasion of a
change in the marginal tax rate is indeterminate when taxes are
progressive in either sense. He has also pointed out that, regardless of
the shape of the tax function, the properties of the risk aversion
function, or whether or not true income is endogenous, the effect of a
change in the marginal tax rate is indeterminate if the probability of
detection is endogenous.
Under a progressive tax system, however, the individual's
decision is affected not only by the marginal tax rate but also by other
factors related to the underlying tax structure. One such factor is the
average tax rate. If the average tax rate is altered through changes in
the level of exemptions, the intra-marginal tax rates, or nontaxable
governmental lump-sum transfers, etc., taxpayers are likely to
respond by modifying their evasion behavior for any given marginal
tax rate.
Traditional tax theory suggests that, unlike changes in the
marginal tax rate, changes in the average tax rate generate only an
income effect. This is because a change in the average tax rate only
affects disposable income, whereas a change in the marginal tax rate
affects not only disposable income but also relative prices. A similar
result might be expected with respect to the evasion decision. If this is
so, and if decreasing risk aversion is assumed, an increase in the
average tax rate should have a negative influence on evasion, ceteris
paribus.3
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Although the effect of changes in the average tax rate under a
progressive tax system has not been explicitly analyzed in the
theoretical evasion literature, insight can be gained from the existing
analyses of the effect of governmental transfers and exemptions. With
the marginal tax rate and before-tax income constant, both of these
have been found to be positively related to unreported income if risk
aversion is a decreasing function of disposable income. This holds
regardless of the specification of the penalty function [Pencavel, 1979
and Koskela, 1983).
These results are consistent with those expected from changes
in the average tax rate and they hold because, like a change in the
average tax rate, changes in these factors generate only an income
effect. In fact, with marginal tax rates and before-tax income constant,
an increase (decrease) in the level of exemptions or lump-sum
transfers reduces (increases) the average tax rate. Thus, one might
reasonably conclude that the theoretical evasion literature provides
some support for expecting a negative relationship between the
average tax rate and evasion. However, given Pencavel's [1979, pp.
123-124] characterization of these and other theoretical results as' ...
rest(ing) on fragile premises ... ', and his call for' ... a healthy infusion
of empirical work to confront these hypotheses with actual behavior
and to resolve the ambiguities ... ' it seems best to approach this
question from an empirical perspective.

III. Empirical Analysis
As mentioned above, previous empirical models of evasion have
generally followed the theoretical studies and have thus included only
a marginal tax rate variable. The results indicate that this variable has
a significant positive effect on evasion [Clotfelter, 1983 and Crane and
Nourzad, l985,1986]. However, if the average tax rate exerts a
separate influence on evasion, its omission from empirical models can
result in biased and inconsistent parameter estimates.
Of the explanatory variables included in empirical models, the
marginal tax rate is most likely to be plagued by these problems.
Fortunately, it is possible to infer the direction of this bias from our
earlier discussion of the expected effect of the average tax rate. If
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average and marginal tax rates do have opposing effects on evasion,
and if they are positively correlated in sample data, the parameter
estimate of the marginal tax rate will be biased downward when the
average tax rate is excluded from the model.
In order to examine these issues we proceed as follows. First,
we estimate an aggregate empirical model of evasion similar to one we
have developed elsewhere for testing other hypotheses regarding tax
evasion [Crane and Nourzad, 1985]. This model serves as a
benchmark since, like most empirical models, it contains only the
marginal tax rate as one of the explanatory variables. We should find
that, as in previous studies, the marginal tax rate has a significant
positive effect on evasion.
Second, we add an average tax rate variable to the benchmark
model, and re-estimate the expanded model. We expect to find that
the marginal tax rate remains positive and significant, but that the
average tax rate has a significant negative effect. Finally, we compare
the estimated coefficient of the marginal tax rate in this expanded
model with that of the benchmark model. We should find the estimate
from the expanded model to be larger, indicating the presence of the
expected downward bias in the marginal tax rate coefficient of the
single-tax-rate model.
Our benchmark model is given by:

where Z is unreported income, MTR is the marginal tax rate, Y is true
income, D represents the probability of detection, F is the fine or
penalty rate to which evaders will be subjected if detected, P is the
inflation rate, R represents the real rate of interest, W is the wage and
salary share of income, tis the time index, and the parentheses contain
the expected sign for the corresponding coefficient.4
This benchmark model contains the four prime variables found
in most theoretical and empirical models, MTR, Y, D, and F. It also
includes two additional explanatory variables, P, and R, that elsewhere
we have shown to influence tax evasion.5 Finally, the model includes
an institutional variable, W, to control for the greater difficulty in
underreporting income that is difficult to conceal. The expanded model
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contains all of the above variables, along with an additional variable,
the average tax rate, denoted ATR.
The measures used to quantify the variables in both models are
briefly described in Appendix A. Here we limit our discussion to the tax
rate measures which are the primary focus of this analysis. The
marginal tax rate, MTR, in equation (I) is calculated using a procedure
suggested by Wright [1969]. This involves summing the marginal rates
in each year's tax schedule after weighting them by the fraction of
total Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) in the corresponding tax bracket.
The purpose of this variable is to capture the overall effect of changes
in marginal tax rates embodied in the progressive income tax system
of the US.
For the average tax rate variable, ATR, we use an aggregate
measure suggested by Roth [1985). This is calculated by dividing total
AGI by the number of returns filed, and expressing the base tax of the
corresponding income bracket as a percent of the lower bound of that
bracket. This approach to calculating the average tax rate was selected
for the following reasons. First, ATR is an aggregate measure of the
average tax rate, as is required for consistency with the rest of the
model. Second. this measure can change without the marginal tax rate
changing and vice versa, as is required by our analysis. Finally, given
that income enters the model as a separate variable, this measure is
less likely to introduce multicollinearity than other alternatives, such
as an effective tax rate.
We estimated both the benchmark and the expanded model for
the US over the years 1947-81 using an instrumental-variable
approach". The results are shown in Table I. where equation (A) is the
benchmark, single-tax-rate model, and equation (B) is the expanded
model containing both tax rates.
Consider first equation (A). It is apparent that this model
performs very well in that the F and adjusted R 2 statistics are quite
high, the coefficients of all variables have the expected signs, and are
generally significant. All three compliance-policy-related variables are
negatively related to evasion. In contrast, the inflation, interest rate,
income, and marginal tax rate variables are all positively related to
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aggregate evasion. These results are consistent with previous
empirical findings [Clotfelter, 1983 and Crane and Nourzad, 1985).
Turning next to equation (B), we see that the coefficient of ATR
is negative and significant at the usual levels, as expected, while that
of MTR remains positive and significant.7 This provides clear support
for our contention that both average and marginal tax rates matter.
Further, the addition of ATR does not greatly affect the sign and
significance of the other variables in the equation. However, the
magnitudes of some of the parameter estimates are different from
equation (A). In particular, the MTR coefficient is now larger. This is
consistent with our earlier argument that in the absence of ATR the
coefficient of MTR can be expected to be biased downward. In fact,
since ATR is statistically Steven E. Crane AND Farrokh Nourzad

different fom zero and is significantly positively correlated with MTR,
the bias is statistically significant.8
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IV. Concluding Remarks
Aside from the obvious implication for the specification of future
empirical models of tax evasion, our findings have a bearing on a
number of tax policy issues. For example, it has been argued that
cutting marginal tax rates may be 'revenue neutral' partly because
lower marginal rates will lead to greater reporting of income, and
therefore, more tax revenue. The usual finding that the marginal tax.
rate is positively related to income tax evasion lends some support to
this argument. This claim is strengthened by the result reported in this
paper that the effect on evasion of the marginal tax rate is larger when
the average tax rate is taken into account.
Further, the result that the average tax rate is negatively
related to evasion also has an implication for the tax reform issue.
Financing 'revenue-neutral' cuts in marginal tax rates requires that
revenues be raised from other sources, that the tax base be
broadened, or that the intra-marginal tax rates by raised to offset the
resulting revenue loss. The last approach would generally involve an
increase in average tax rates. However, based on our findings, it
appears that the increase necessary to achieve revenue neutrality
need not be as great as might otherwise be
expected because the increased average tax rate should bring about a
further reduction in evasion.
Finally, given the opposing effects of marginal and average tax
rates on evasion, a tax-cut package that reduces both rates should
require significant 'supply-side' effects if revenue neutrality is to be
achieved. In fact, in our sample the sum of the two tax rate
coefficients is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that
equal cuts in the two rates are 'evasion neutral' so that supply-side
effects would have to carry the entire burden of the cuts.

Appendix A: Variable Construction
This appendix draws heavily on Appendix A in Crane and
Nourzad [1985], and briefly describes the measures used for the
variables in equation (I) other than the two tax rates which are
discussed in the text. For data sources see Appendix B in the above
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reference.
Unreported income, Z. This is a modified version of the Adjusted
Gross Income (AGI) Gap computed by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) by comparing a measure of AGI derived from the data
in the National Income Accounts (BEA AGI) with that reported by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The AGI Gap is a measure of the
unreported income received in the official economy, and does not
include 'underground' income flows. It has been modified to remove
from it an imputed value of the AGI of those not required to file tax
returns.
True income, Y. The measure used is deflated BEA AGI that has
been modified to eliminate the income of those not required to file tax
returns.
Probability of detection, D This variable is calculated as the
moving average of the current, one-year, and two-year lagged values
of the percentage of total tax returns audited each year by the IRS.
Penalty rate, F. This rate is the ratio of the additional taxes,
penalties, and interest assessed by the IRS during the year in
question, to the amount of taxes evaded. The denominator of this ratio
is the product of the AG I Gap defined above and MTR. This
specification ism keeping with the US practice of imposing penalties on
evaded taxes rather than evaded income.
Inflation rate, P. This is calculated as the rate of change of the
Consumer Price Index.
Interest rate, R. This is an average of the savings and time
deposit rates converted into real terms by removing from it the
inflation rate as defined above.
Wage and salary share, W This is the share of wages and
salaries in national income.
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Summary
In this paper, it is argued that average tax rates exert an
influence on income tax evasion separate from, and opposite to that of
marginal tax rates. Failure to account for this effect in empirical
evasion models biases the parameter estimate of the marginal rate in
a predictable manner. Evidence from an aggregate empirical model of
evasion in the US indicates that the marginal tax rate is positively
related to evasion, whereas the average tax rate is negatively related.
Further, exclusion of the average rate from the model does in fact bias
the parameter estimate of the marginal tax rate.
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Notes
1 It should be pointed out that Srinivasan [1973] was the first to develop a
model of evasion with progressive taxes. However, he assumed risk
neutrality.
2 A linear progressive tax system is one where the average tax rate rises with
income but the marginal rate is constant. A nonlinear progressive
system is one where both tax rates rise with income.
3 Of course, this ignores the complications that might arise from the
specification of the penalty function.
4 The expected signs are based on the theoretical literature or previous
empirical findings. For a summary of the rationale for these
expectations, see Crane and Nourzad [1985].
5 For a discussion of the justification for including inflation and Interest rates
in an aggregate model of evasion, see Crane and Nourzad [1985, 1986].
6 This estimation approach was used in recognition of the possible
simultaneity between the dependent variable and the income and
penalty variables. For more on this see the discussion in Appendix A of
Crane and Nourzad [1985]
7 Although the absolute values of these parameter estimates appear to be
different, they are not statistically significantly different from each other
(F125 = 0.333).
8 Econometric theory indicates that the omitted-variable bias equals the
product of two terms: I) the parameter estimate of the omitted variable
(ATR) when it is included in the 'true' model, and 2) the estimated
coefficient of the variable which is suspected to be biased (MTR)
obtained from a regression of the omitted variable (ATR) on all of the
explanatory variables of the 'true' model, including the suspect variable
(MTR) [Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981, pp. 128-130].
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